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I.

WHAT'S BEHIND THE WALL?
At first sight the Berlin wall can throw It he ,A merican tourist
off the track. If he is interested in learning the truth about the
recurrent "crises" over Berlin he'll have It o do more than just look.
And these days there is compelling reason why every American
should be keenly interested. If the recent Cuban crisis brought us
all face.to.face vtith the peril of a world nuclear catastrophe, the
Berlin question is potentially far more explosive. At the same
time, the resolution of the most threatening aspects of the Cuban
crisis revived the opportunity as well as the urgent necessity for
action in respect to Berlin. It is now' not only absolutely manda·
tory but also entirely feasible to settle peacefully and honorably .
this inflammatory problem, so sternly sYlnbolized by the Berlin
,vall.
The wall is merely a concrete barrier topped by barbed wire. It
was erected on August 13, 1961 by the East Berlin government
along the already existing frontier between the two secitons of
Berlin.
Probably it's .the barbed wire that gives it its formidable appearance. Add to that the tank barriers erected at the checkpoints
which control the entrances and exits of traffic be~ween the two
sections, and the East German frontier guards, young men who
stand facing the West with legs apart and autoluatic rifles always
at the ready.
It's a pr~tty grim affair and an Amerioan peering at it from
West Berlin and relying solely on eye-witness impressions is apt to
draw some hard and fast-and absolutely wrong-conclusions.
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To understand Ithe wall and vvhat it symbolizes, to relate it 'to the
real causes of tension in Berlin and the real source of danger to the
American people, we had to do a lot of looking and listening on
both sides of Ithe wall and a lot of mulling over whaat we'd seen
and heard. We also had to do some toug.h hO'm-e--work in history,
past as well as recent, but after much thought and study we felt
reasonably 'c onfident 'w e had found t:!he morsel of truth at the source
of ,the sparks which threaten any day to' blow up into a conflagration that can also ,c onsume America. Knowing where the sparks
O'riginate may help av.ert the explosion.
The first thing Americans need to know about Berlin is that it
is German, not American.
Like the rest of Germany, Berlin is divided into an eastern and
a western part. But both parts are 120 miles inside ithe former
Soviet occupation zone which is now the German Democratic Republic (GDR). A glance at the map will show that Berlin lies
closer to Poland than to the former Anglo-American-Fren'c h occupa:tion zones, which now constitute the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG).
Americans may travel freely in both German states and in both
sections of Berlin. A passport is sufficient for 'the FRG and for
West and E'ast IB·e rlin. For travel through the rest of the G·D R a
v.isa is required.
But the average American, looking at the two German states,
is side..ltracked from the very beginning. OUT newspaapers and
newscasts and commentators, in their vast majority, as well as
our government, and its various departments and agencies, are
frank about their bias. So ,t:!hat the American visitor, his head
crammed with this bias and with canned interpretations of events
in BerHn and the two Gerlnanys, ·c annot but approach the wall
with a -c losed n1ind. A look at the wall is supposed to fix indelibly and irrevocably all those preconceptions. It is supposed to
be final and conclusive proof of the judgments already made for
him. How is he to know that it should actually be only the
beginning of his investigation? Look.ing a!t it from the West Berlin
side, where -t he aut:horities have helpfully erected platforms for the
8

edification of tourists, most Americans are easily persuaded that the
wall is incontrovertible evidence of "Communist aggress·iveness
.and injustice."
Even if not already so. persuaded, Americans find West Berlin
-beyond which many never travel eastward-teeming with "per.s uaders." Tha·t section of the city is virtually crammed with slick,
'!\Tell-groomed young men and ·c hic young women with nice eyes
who are eager to discuss the "menace of Bolshevism" in cafes,
.h otel lobbies, or cozier quarters. There are other helpful sources
of "information"-ordinary West Berlin shopkeepers and workers
intent on exploiting whatever adVlantage can he derived from telling A'm ericans what they believe Americans want to hear; personnel of NATO occupation forces, glibly repeating the catchphrases of their indoctrination; and, of course, the 'tVest Berlin
police, those "absolute auth9rities" on the statistics of ",C ommunist aggression."
Then there are the WeS't Berlin newspapers and radio newscasts. Even Americans accustomed to war scares and jingoist
hysteria in our information media think the "Vest Berlin agencies
lay it on too thick. Tales of horror and brutality in East Berlin
are contrasted to the "freedom" and "happiness" of West Berliners. Harsh and obscene epithets are freely hurled at the leaders
of the GDR. The favored taliget is Walter U1bricht, chairman of
the GDR Council of lVlinisters and first secretary of the Socialist
Unity Party . . He is charaoterized as everything odious under ,t he
sun, but never what his life-long record shows-a German who
never faltered in oppo.sing militarists, junkers, money-kings and
reactionary politicians who 'repeatedly dragged his country and his
people into disaster.
Another, more insidious way of influencing the visiting American has been made possible through ' the thoughtfulness of our own
businessmen. The American need not trouble to hring anything
with hi;m to West Berrl.in. He will ·f ind virtually every art,i cle of
necessity in West Berlin shops---4American-made as well as West
German products and those from other NA.TO countries. Don't
underestimate the feeling of "all's right with the world" which
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comes with finding a newspaper from home in the hotel lobby
or the corner newsstand. ,O r the availability of A'mellican cigarettes and American liquors, of American automobiles and American-style night clubs with the added attraction of German and
European performers in ever-so-exotic atmospheres, of American
jazz every minute of the day and night if one desires itI In such
circumstances it is not too diffi,c ult to feel that West B'e rlin is not so
different from home, and then to lapse into forgetting that it
acually is not home.
None of this is to be found in East Berlin. True enough, an
East German, Chinese, Czech, Soviet or Hungarian article is generally no worse, sometimes better, than its American-m,a de counterpart. And consumer goods made .in the GD'R and other socialist
countries are plentiful in East Berlin stores. But these goods are
strange to the American. And the very absence of the familiar
American name-brand favorites, although it may seem an insignificant thing, helps West Berlin propaganda sell the idea that everything in the East is strange, alien-and hostile.
Open, active and aggressive persuaders slw arm in the Federal
Republic. In fact, persuasion of the American is SIQ conspicuous
a feature of West German behavior that the wonder is more Americans don't suspect it is state policy. Yet, if this idea ever crosses
the Alm erican's mind, how is he to put it to ,the test? Whom should
he ask to verify it? 'C ertainly it is extremely unlikely he will me'e t
someone with a different outlook, fur instance, a German peace
advocate, anti-fascist or Communist, millions of whom live and
work in the Federal Republic. Americans simply don't move about
in such circles. Even more improbable is his chance of meetli ng
such a person, or any West German for that matter, 'Who will talk
freely and frankly to an American-conditions being what they are
under the Bonn government.
In the atmosphere we found in West 'G ermany, it sounded a
trifle odd to hear a hotel employee in FTankfurt declare that West
Berlin is "the key to America's survival," our "last outpost" and
(/'firs't bastion" in Europe, and that if "those East Berlii n Communists" are allowed to control the troop and air corridors into
)0

West Berlin, American civilization will be placed in mortal
jeopardy. It also seemed presumptuous for Germans to' lecture us
about our country's national interests-'though the words and
arguments were almDst identical to those we've been .reading and
hearing for years in our own country. And we didn't relish it
when a 'c lerk in a Berlin department store told a cus tomer standing alO'ngside us that Hitler had had the .r ight idea but had merely
"made mistakes." The concern for American survival and nostalgia for Hitler somehow did nDt seem to go together.
We had a memm-able conversation with an affluent middleaged cDuple whO' looked the soul of veracity and ''''ho, with
nary a smile and in solemn pontifical tones, described to' us in
detail the massed Soviet rormatiDns we would see on the other
side of the Berlin wall: tank trDops and tanks, paratroops, atDmic
guns, missile carriers, et cetera. "YO'u can't see them from West
Berlin," they said, "but they're in all the side streets of East Berlin. Some of the tanks even keep their motors running around the
clock!"
Perhaps most helpful of all was the remark of a chap who
looked like a banker and talked like a college professDr but who
was actually a trade union official. He probably wouldn't .~ave
his job Dr his liberty if his name were known. We can identify
him only as one of the rare species of Social DemDcratic Party
officials whO' has managed to' keep both his positiDn and a modicum of dedication to West G rmany's workers.
To our question regarding the attitude of the West German
workers toward the Berlin wall, he asked a simple question: "If
the Communists are bent on attacking us in these days of missiles
and mobile high-speed offensive arms, why would they build a wall
around their territory to keep us ou t?"
We thDught this one over. Yes, a wall is basically defensive and
protective, like a fence. People don't build fences to' attack their
neighbors or trespass on their neighbors' property. A wall is in all
essential purposes a reinforced fence. Is that the function and
purpose of the Berlin wall? TO' establish the truth about this required more than a look.
1
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E ven a look, however, will clear up one matter-there are no
Soviet fonnations Inassed in East Berlin. We looked high and low
for them, on main streets .and in side streets. The only Soviet
military personnel we saw were a couple of officers 'on a shopping
junket in East Berlin and the soldiers standing guard at the big
memorial, in West Berlin, to the Soviet troops who fell during the
Battle of Berlin.
Soviet troops garrisoned in the coun try are there in accordance
with the stipulations of the Warsaw Pact, the defense alliance of
the socialist states, just as Ameri'c an, British and French troops
are garrisoned in the German Federal Republic as stipulated in
N·A T:O agreements. But this is not the same thing as being massed
behind the Berlin wall with their tank motors running! Why,
we asked ourselves, ,,yould that nice old Frankfort couple, with
such intelligent and honest faces, want us to -think the Soviets
are poised to attack the West?
It is a fact that any American can verify with his own eyes
that the Berlin wall is manned by Germans-citizens and frontier
guards of the GDR. There are no Soviet troops involved in this
operation. Nor, for that matter, are Soviet troops involved in the
administration either of East Berlin or of the GDR. And believe
it or not, the Soviet commander in the GDR does not have veto
power over either the East Berlin adminis-tration or the -G DR's
administration of its frontiers-ex(:ept in relation to the corridors
fl'om Western Germany to West Berlin, which Soviet troops control
in keeping vvith an agreement with the GDR.
This is obviously hard f.or Ameri'cans to believe, since it is contrary to everything we have read and heard about Soviet relations
with the East Germans. It is even harder to believe, since we know
that the West Berlin administration is under the thumb of commanders of the NATO Qccupation trQops. Mayor Willy Brandt is
compelled ,to' rush to the commanders for their CQnsent on every
principle issues. Last winter the occupation authorities even rejected his request to allow the West German police to help clear
the snow from the streets.
Yet, the fact can easily be veri,fied at the wall. I t is Germans
12

who. pDlice and ,oontl:DI the wall, but at the checkpoints it is not
Germans but NATO trDops who. carry out these functions in West
Berlin. Thus, at Checkpoint 'C harley, the Friedrichstrasse control
point bordering on the American oCGupation zone, it is our troops
who confront the 'G ernlans.
This is nDt altogether meaningless, especially as it relates to
the conception so prevalent in our country that "Moscow" and
"Premier Khrushchev" are trying "to push" us out of West Berlin.
What you see at the ,vall doesn't lend plausibility to this idea. In
the first place there are no. Soviet forces there to. do the "pushing"
even if that were their intention. This.is odd because, as they
showed during the Battle of Berlin, when push comes to shove,
the Soviets are adept at both. 1£ "pushing" us out of West Berlin
were really the Kremlin's aim, why in the world would it take
measures to reduce Dr eliminate every kind of contact between
Soviet and A,m erican troops, that is, to remove all possfbili ties
of a clash that could serve as a pretext for "pushing" us out?
'S ome people, like Senal}or Thomas Dodd of Connecticut, have
a simple explanation for this. He expressed it on Dave Susskind's
TV show, September 30, 1962. All we have to. do is "be firm"
with the Soviets, he said, and they'll back down. He documented
this thesis w.ith the observation that the Soviet had been transporting their guards for the SDviet memorial in West Berlin through
Chec}(,point Charley. We told them to take another route and they
did. They'd been using armored cars to transport the guards and
we told them to quit doing this and they did. Therefore, all we
have to do is "be firm."
But the Senator apparently didn't appreciate the fact that the
Soviet compliance with American requests, far from convincing
anybody that the Kremlin is intent on "pushing" us out of West
Berlin, merely shows the Kremlin's inclination to avoid situations
that could escalate into a development in which real pushing by
both sides might be unavoidable. The Senator also forgot, or
seemed to have forgotten, the one case which completely refutes
his argument. This was the occasion in October, 1961, "vhen
General Lucius ,C lay ordered American tanks to drive up Fried-

richstrasse and "to hell with the wall." If that is ,the kind of "firmness" Senator Dodd has in mind, it didn't payoff. The Soy.iets
also drove their tanks up to the wall and theirs outgunned ours.
The show got Clay more plaudits as a hero and our newspaper
publishers sold a lot more newspapers, but after you tote up the
profits and losses, there's nothing whatsoever left to underwrite
Senator Dodd's prescription for a Berlin settlement.
On the other hand, what you actually see in Berlin is the total
absence of any evidence to back the assertion that somebody is
trying "to push" us out of West Berlim. And if what you see isn't
enough to convince you, you ought to ponder on what reasons
could move Khrushchev to try toO eliminate all possibilities of a
Soviet-American clash by turning over control of even the access
routes to 'Vest Berlin to Germans-to the GDR authorities. This
is one of things he wants to achieve through his often-proposed
peace treaty with the two German states.
One other aspect of the "aggressive" character of the Berlin
wall struck us, something w·e 'd read about long before we ever
saw ~he wall. ' We thought it extremely peculiar that an aggressive
contraption should invariably produce casualties amongst the alleged aggressors instead of among the aggressors' targets. We wondered why the victims of every incident to date have been East
German frontier guards or East Berliners-why not a single member
of the N A T IO occupation forces and not a single person on the
West Berlin side of the frontier has been a casualty of this wall.
Unless the East GermalIls are invariably poorer marksmen than
their West German counterparts, which was a trifle hard to swallow,
50me other explanation 'was required.
We went to East Berlin to check on some of these con tradictions. We were able to do so without difficulty. The East Berlin
authorities were not in the least reluctant to allow us to inspect
the wall and speak with the frontier guards. We could never have
imagined the situation was the way we found it.

II.

HOW INCIDENTS ARE MADE
The day we chose to inspect the 'wall was one of mid-July'S
best-not too warm, not too much sun, just pleasant. We'd have
preferred to sit at one of .the many sidewalk cafes that dot East
Berlin's downtown and eat ice cream, or go window-shopping on
Karl Marx Allee, or even look through some of the new apartlnents
constantly being built in the GD'R capital. Thanks to prefabrication and sound budgeting. But our appointment was fixed and
we were aware that not every American visiting East Berlin has
the chance to speak with the commander of the GDR's First
Fron tier Br.igade.
Lt. Col. Gerhardt Tschichke is 47, a man of medium height,
very energetic, and quite informal-a far cry from the Prussian
martinets one expects every German officer to be. He interrupted
his work and sat at a table with us. We asked about incidentshow many, where, what, who, with what consequences?
"The most serious incidents happened in May and June this
year," he said. "On May 23, Sergeant Peter Goering of our border
guards was shot and killed. On June 18, Sergeant Reinhold Huhn
was shot and killed in cold blood by an agent of West German
groups who had tunneled under the wall to take a group of OUT
people over to West BeTlin."
(l~fter returning to the United States 'we learned that a third
GD·R ci'tizen, Captain Rudi Arnstadt of the People's Anny, had
been killed on August 14.)
"Have any West Berlin police or N·A TO forces been killed?"
we as'k ed.
"Not one. None have even been injured because none of our

people have ever fired at them. We have strict discipline alTIOng
our guards."
He walked to a bulletin board in his office and pulled off a
document tacked to it. "We have four rules in regard to the use
of weapons and we require absolute obedience." He laid the order
on the table and read off the rules.
"First, no member of the occupation troops must be shot at or
even aimed at.
"Second, firing is permitted only when parallel with the frontier,
never across it.
"Third, it is absolutely impermissible for children to be aimed
at-no matter "what ,the circumstances.
"Fourth, before firing at violators of the frontier or before even
threatening to fire, every attempt .m ust be made to arrest thelTI."
Colonel Tschichke looked up. "Once a month all guards must
sign documen ts stating that they have been informed of these
instructions and have obeyed them. They don't have the right to
use weapons even in self-defense against assault."
We glanced across the hall at one of the guards who had just
entered. His automatic rifle hung from his shoulders with its
muzzle pointed directly forwa·r d and its trigger within instant
reach of his right hand. This did not seem to fit iill with the
Colonel's explanation.
"Why arm these guards with automatic rifles and order them
to carry them ready for action if they're forbidden to use then1?"
"They 'will certainly use them when necessary to protect our
territory and our people," replied the Colonel. ",C ertain people
in West Berlin keep talking about smashing across the frontier
in fOTce. We want to discourage them from such fool hardly
action. But if they are not discouraged and persis t, we want to
be ready to stop them at a moment's notice."
"Then people can fire at your guards from the West Berlin
side, but you won't let your guards return the fire? Surely, such
a set-up is not going to discourage them. On the contrary, it may
well encourage mor,e provocations on the part of West Berlin."
"Correct. We do not return their fire. We can say that they
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have not, at least so faT, tried tQ smash their way through by
force. Oli the other hand, we have not been able to stop their
provocations. If we replied to every provocation from West Berlin, we would actually be carrying on a shQoting war."
He got up again and walked over to a row of files. Returning
with a folder of documents, he laid them out on the table.
"Here, take a look at these. They are our monthly records
of provocations."
We copied the figures in our notebooks. Here's a summary
of the record of p~ovocat.ions in Colonel Tschichke's files for
the period from January I, 1962 to July 15, 1962:
J ia nuary . . .... .. .. .. . . 238
February .. . ... .. ..... . 231
March . . . .. .. . .. '.' . . . . 318
J\pril
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 2 9
May .. .. .. . ... .... .. . . 361
June ... . ..... . . .. . .. . . 357
July (1-15) ........ . ... 16.5
The provocations were classified according to type and according to the identity of those involved. In the six and one-half
month's' period, there were:
443 disturbances and nuisances caused by hurling incendiaries
in East Berlin buildings, dumping bottles and refuse over the wall,
shooting OUit window panes with BB guns, and so on;
86 provocative broadcasts by soundtrucks brought up to the
wall;
.135 cases of damage inflicted on the wall;
202 attempted violations of the frontier from the West by driving past :contTol officers at the checkpoints, ignoring control officers and accos ting them, etc.
622 attempts to' establish contacts with East Berliners;
6 contacts successfully carried th'fough;
37 2 attacks on frontier guards with stones, bottles, etc.
63 attacks 'On frontier guards with gunfirel

As to the identify of the provocateurs, this could not be established in 118 of the provocations. Of the rest, 718 were committed by civilians, 589 by West Berlin .police and customs officials and 494 involved troops of the NAiTO forces.
Colonel Tschichke pointed out that "each month the provocations increase a.nd become more serious." He declared that "the
NATO Jtroops in West Berlin are becoming more aggressive. Attempts are increasing to explode hand grenades and plastic bombs
-like the French ultras. Every day NATIO troops aim at our
border guards and pretend to pull the trigger. Sometimes their
trigger fingers slip."
He told us these provocations are covered up by the West
Berlin police, who manufacture stories about incidents in which
East Berlin guards are alleged to be the aggressors. We did not
doubt this since almost ,every report in our press of an incident
in Berlin is issued or "confirmed" by the West Berlin police.
"Only last night on Heidelberger Strasse, in the American
sector, youngsters shot at our guards with air rifles," the Colonel
went on. "They even shot through the open window of a family
living near the border-a woman w'as hit. Five yards from these
hoodlums were two West Berlin police who did nothing whatsoever to stop it."
He said this type of provocation is usually a diversion to distract attention from a more serious incident being carried out
at some other part of the frontier. "Sure enough, about one
thousand yards from that place an incendiary was thrown at one
of our lookout boxes."
He went to his desk and brought an object wrapped in paper.
It was a shoe polish can, perforated on top, and 'c ontaining a rag
soaked in gasoline.
"Pretty amateurish, something kids would do," he said. "But
it could have started a fire and destroyed the lookout box."
Colonel Tschichke gave us pennission to inspect the wall and
to talk with the frontier g.uards at Checkpoint Charley. Funny
what a different impression you get from the eastern side of this
over-sensationalized spot! While we were there a couple of buses
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full of Danish schoolteachers passed through for a sightseeing
tour of East Berlin. It was all very routine, like going to Canada
from Niagara Falls or to Ensenada Beach from San Diego. For
foreigners there's nothing to it but a display of one's passport.
The main purpose of the contr()l is to check on East Berliners
and GDR citizens going to West Berlin, and West Berliners and
FRG citizens going to East Berlin. For them, a permit is required
in addition to their passpoot, and application fonns are available
at the checkpoint.
But the view from the eastern side of Checkpoint Charley is
no more edifying than that from the western side. The first thing
that caught our attention was the gang of West Berlin police and
tough-looking youths standing on the corner. They were laugh:ing and joking, but every pedestrian that passed from one or the
other direction got a severe going over. They scrutinized him with
keen attention.
On the elevated plat£orm a few feet from this gang ·w ere a
group of tourists. Two had binoculars, all were staring at the
GDR frontier guards and watching the processing of traffic
through the control point. Having already seen what they were
watching, we know there was nothing to look at but the buildings in the background and the traffic. But this seemed to satisfy
them and a few began unleashing cameras and taking shots of the
scenery.
The little house in the center of the street, about 150 yards
west of the wall, was the U.S. control post. The Stars and Stripes
fluttered over it and a tall M.P stood at the entrance. A U.S.
A·r m y official car ,vas parked Ib efore the door.
I t was a very dull picture and we had to put our ilnagination
to work in order to figure out why touris,ts came to this spot.
"Why all the interest over there at this moment?" we asked
a sergeant of the guards who was showing us the place.
"They hope something will happen," he replied.
"Think :they'll get their hope?"
"One never knows. rrhere are a few more West Berlin police
and hoodlums than usual. Something could happen any time."
19

He told us he doubted it today, however, because the press
and propaganda agencies weren't out in force. He said that
when a provocClJtion was being planned, the West Berlin police
and the agencies carrying ilt out usually notified the press so as
to get as much publicity as possible.
"&ecently a car with a U.S. license drove up to the border,"
the sergeant said. "The passengers got out and placed a fried
chicken leg across the den1arcation line, that is, in our terr~tory.
Then they drove off. But we looked up and saw an entire battery
of cameras in a western observation tower. They were trained
on the spot where the chicken leg lay. They hoped to photogTaph
one of our men picking it up. It would have made good propaganda about everybody in the GDR being hungry."
We left the wall feeling sure about one thing-it was being
used for purposes of defense. What we had seen and heard provided no whit of evidence tor any other conclusion. The evidence
we had obtained established Ithe defensive, pea:ceful function of this
concrete fence.
Also, we heard something at Checkpoint Charley that gave
us cause for concern. We didn't have time to wait and check the
story and can't vouch for its validity. But we have no reason
to doubt its veracity and we pass it on just as we heard it.
The place was one of the reception rooms in the control station operalted by the GDR frontier guards. We were talking with
guard Heinz Klemm, a 24-year-old woodworker from a small village in Thuringia. Heinz's father was a worker, too, he told us,
and life had not been too easy for the family. When some pals
of Heinz went to West Berlin and brought back leaflets calling for
provocations against the GD1R and demanding the incorporaJtion
of the GDR into the Federal Republic and NATO, Heinz blew
his top. Next day he quit his job and volunteered fOT It he frontier
guards.
We asked Heinz if he and his buddies exchanged greetings
with our American boys at Checkpoint Charley. Heinz replied
that he had been a frontier guard for two and one-half years and
had been stationed at various parts of the frontier. He said he
20

ha~

often exchanged civilities with the English and French frontier troops but never with the Americans.
"The Americans seem really to hate us," he said. "Stay here
a few days and you'll -see ·them march up to the frontier some
morning. They raise their hands in the nazi salute and shout
'Sieg heil!' They know we don't think that's £unny."
Neither did we. Having visilted Buchenwald and nazi death
camps' in the USSR, we fail to see anything funny whatsoever in any
part of nazi ritual 'Or practice. But what disturbed us most was
Heinz's information about the atJtitude of American youth, who are
demonstrating hat'r ed for those very -G erman youth who are resolved there'll be no return of ,the nazis in this part of Germany.
If Heinz was telling the truth, something seemed very wrong about
our choice of friends at the wall.

21

III.

TRUTH ABOUT THE "ESCAPES"
If the wall is a defense and protection vis-a-vis West Berlin
and the Federal Republic, is it also a defense and prote~tion vis-avis the East Berliners and the citizens of ,t he GDR? Is it, :as
our newspapers say, a fence to keep GD·R citizens in? The
barbed wire atop .the concrete bar,r ier certainly reminds one of
pictures of a concentration camp, and ,t hat is precisely what the
GDR has been called by its enemies. West ,G erman Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer and his aides are forever charging that the people of the GDR are virtual prisoners of the 'C ommunists, held
against their will and forced to wOTk, and that if the wall wasn ~ t
there the East Germans would all flee to the Federal Republic.
We went to see a number of people to get the facts on this
matter. None of them support Adenauer's claims.
"Germany has been split into two states since 1949," Hermann
Axen reminded us. Axe'll is a youthful-appearing, stocky man who
spent time in Hitler's concentration camps and is no\ov editor in
chief of Neues Deutschland organ of the ruling Socialist Unity
Party.
He talked to us for almost an hour in the office adjoining
the paper's editorial rooms and had his secretary bring in files
of old papers from time to time to establish his points. It was
close to deadline time and we weren't very happy at the thought
of interviewing ·a n editor at such an hour. But Axen seemed
to think our questions important.
"The thing to remember is that during all those years from
J
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1949 the frontier was open. You could go to West Berlin simply
by buying a subway ticket and getting off there. And about two
million people passed back and forth. across the border every day
in Berlin alone. Sixty thousand East Berliners worked in West
Berlin and eighteen thousand West Berliners worked in East
Berlin. So what happened when the border was open?
"About two ·m illion people left for good, ClJbout half a million
came, and about seventeen million stayed. That's important to
keep in mind-seventeen million of our people stayed."
"But what about the people who left? Why did they leave?"
"We estimate that most of the people who left did so for
economic reasons," Axen replied. "About a third went f.or political
reasons.
"Don't forget what the GDR was like during those years after
the war. This was the least industrialized sec~i()n of Germany. We
had some factories but no raw materials. All of Germany's heavy
industry was located. in the ' West, mainly in the Ruhr but also
in other sections of what is now the Federal Republic. In contrast,
this was predominantly an agrarian region.
"Also, don't forget !that this was the homeland of the Junkers
and the Prussian militarists, and the nazi m'Ovemen t was a mass
movement here."
We had heard this from other GDR citizenes. Nazi ideas and
methods had made a deep im.p rint. An entire nation had been
infected. We remembered attending the opera in Leipzig and
watching the faces in the lobbies during the intermission. A friend
had answered some of our questions.
"That one? You can't be sure. I've never seen him before.
He might be an ex-SS officer-looks arrogant and mean enough.
But it's wrong to jump to conclusions. He may be completely
reformed. . . . The elegant one in the ·backless gown? Never SaJW
her before either. But she's certainly sleek. Definitely wellpreserved-you can bet she wasn't suffering in the early 1940'S. . . .
Oh yes, certainly there are Jewish people here. I've never heard
of any incident. Not that there aren't people Who would like
to-but they don't dare. They'd land in prison and fast . . . "
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Only seventeen yea·rs since the war ended, since the nazis' house
of cards crashed, oarrying millions of Germans with it! In East
Germany they took on the responsihili ty of changing the minds
and hearts of nearly twenty million people. Two million wouldn't
stay, and about a third of these wouldn't stay for political reasons!
How remarkable that those who left for political reasons were
only one-third of the two million, that is, only a f.ra<:tion of the
total population of East Germany! This had been the Soviet
occupation zone, and it had been the Soviet people against whom
the nazis commi tted their mos t fiendish w,a r crimes. This sector
"was now ruled by an anti-fascist, anti-racist coalition in which
German Communists were the most powerful component, and it
had been the German Communists as ~ll as the "G erman Jews
against whom the nazis had been m"o st inhuman. Yet, seventeen
millions Germans, a majority of whom had been subjected" to the
virus of nazism, had elected to stay in this pa:rt of Germany!
"This is the more signi'f icant fact-not the number who left,"
declared Hermann Axen.
But why are the "escapes" continuing? How many of these can
be attributed to political disaffection, how many to the economic
situa1tion?
"
"You asked why we built the wall," he said. "That is one
of the reasons-to prevent our economy from being undermined.
First, after the three Western Powers violated the Potsdam Agreement and introduced a sepaTalte currency, they organized the systematic theft of our goods. Later, when we checked out, they
launched a massive plunder of our skilled labor force and OUT
specialists, luring them with all sorts of exaggerated offers and
promises. To stop this, it was necessary to establ,i sh control over
our frontier. The wall has done that."
Axen went into detail about both types of "theft." He explained how the introduction of another currency in West Berlin
and Western Germany had affected the East German economy.
West Berlin speculators, he said, had set a,r tificial rates of one
West mark to four East marks, and this rate had been immediately recognized by the Western Powers as "official." This enabled
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people who worked in West Berlin but lived in East Berlin to buy
goods in East Berlin and sell them in West Berlin at a considerable
profit. They were paid in vVest marks which they exchanged for
East Inarks at the rate of one to four, bought up goods in E.as,t
Berlin, carried them back to West Berlin and sold them for 'Vest
marks, which they again exchanged for East marks, and so on.
Thus, the currency "refonn," as it was called in the West, and
the subsequent manipulation of rates, enabled the enemies of the
East German regime to corrupt a section of the East Berlin populaltion through financial racketeering, to strip the East German
stores of consumer goods, and to incite unrest and discontent over
the resulting shortages. Every year they took out about 5,500 tons
o.f meat, 2,000 tons of butter, clothes, cameras, typewriters and
other articles, in vast quantities.
"The Wes t B'e rliners claimed there was no freedom in the
East," said Axen, "but they came here in droves and bought up
everything they could. They were perlectly free to do so.
"This went o.n for years," he Iw ent on. "It was ruinous and
drained the country. It cost us about three-and-a-half billion marks
a year. Finally, we instituted some oontTol. It no longer was
so easy for West BeTliners to. come here and buy up our goods.
But East Berliners who worked in West Berlin and had become
corrupted could still evade the controls to a certain extent. They
lived here, enjoyed our low rents, our medical care and other
social services at the expense of the tax-payers, and at the same
titne were participating in this robbery of our consumer goods."
NOIt to be set back by the GD!R's controls, West Berlin and
West German authorities concentrated on taking the GDR's skilled
workers. The Federal Republic was enjoying a boom during these
years, thanks to the Marshall Plan and the enterprise of American
business bigwigs who are buying into West German corporations.
Industries were demanding more wo.rkers, and governments and
politicians took st:eps to get them. GD,R leadeTs speak of what
followed as "syste·m atic head-hunting campaigns."
A psychologis't friend vvh'O is a staff member of the GDIR 's
outstanding experimental medical institute, told us: "All the
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experts in our institute have received job offers from "Vest Berlin."
She said that although she and her colleagues were well paid and
had the opportunity for advancement, many of the offers from
West Berlin held out still greater salary increases and promotions.
The recruitment of the GDR's skilled workers and specialists
became a fixed policy of all West German corporations and thereby
the policy of the West German state and the West Berlin government. There were other motivations in the development of this
policy. Bonn politicians saw it as a means of subverting GDR
authority; West German militarists and revanchists calculated on
using it to achieve their aims vis~a-vis not only the GDR but also
the countries of E.a stern Europe; the We~tern Powers exploited it
in the cold war against the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc.
And to achieve each of these aims, huge sums were spent, special
purpose organizations were set up by the score, and hundreds
of thousands of people were employed.
For example, the Bayer Chemical Works in Leverkusen, FRG,
is a subsidiary of IG F.arben, the same IG Farben which supplied
munitions to Hitler's war machines and gas to Himmler's death
factories. This subsidiary set up a so-called "Immigrants' Committee" with the set objective of recruiting GDR specialists. To
anyone who recruited a GD'R scientist it paid a "bonus" of 500
to 1,000 marks.
For recruiting pharmaceutical workers from the GDR, the
Asta Cheluical Works in Brackwede, vVestphalia, paid up to 1,000
marks.
In 1960, the Bonn M-inistry for Expelled and "Var Injured
Persons allocated ~wo million marks (about half a million dollars)
for the recruitm·e nt of GDR university professors.
In Ig61, the Equalization of Burdens Bank received 37 million
marks for granting credits to employers who would set up enterprises in West Germany with workers recruited from the GDR.
The Bonn Ministry of Labor and Social Order spent over
four billion marks (roughly $1 billion!) in Ig61 for "war victims
and similar expenditures." The term "similar expenditures" was
a euphernism for recruitment of GDR workers.
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Such examples could go on and on. The biggest names in
West German business circles actively participated-Friedrich
Krupp, Telefunken, AEIG , Deutsche Bank and I,G Farben. All
the political parties of the Federal Republic took part through
their "Eastern Bureaus." Every ministry of the Bonn government
was involved. All the major professional associations and organizations of employers, resettled Germans from Eastern countries,
veterans and other groupings of the population had special departments concerned with this work.
A tell-tale document is a di'r ective issued August 21, 1956 by
the West Germ,a n Ministry for All.JGerman Affairs and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation "concerning the encouragement
of meetings on Federal territory or West Berlin between inhabitants of the Soviet occupation zone including East Berlin and
inhabitants of Federal German territory or 'Vest Berlin.". This
directive provided for the payment of sums to cover "travelling
expenses" of GDR citizens enticed to attend such meetings. As
much as 20,000 marks were paid for these "'t ravelling expenses."
The directive stipulated that: "Only citizens of the Soviet occupation zone who can produce evidence of citizenship may receive
this assistance. Thes'e citizens of the Soviet occupation zone must
be prepared and able to represent all-German interests in the
Soviet occupation zone according to the West German conception."
From the very s tart of this recruitment cam'p aign, it was clear
what was meant by the "West German conception" of "representing all-German interests" in the GD,R . The recruitment of workers, which many Americans might consider only fair business practices in a competitive society, ·a lso entailed other obligationsespionage, subversion, the fomenting of civil strife. In respect of
these, all the motivations behind the recruitlnent campaigns coincided. GDR leaders have repeatedly listed by address, telephone
number and name the number of organizations actively working
in West Berlin to achieve the aim of "liberating" the GDR and its
socialist allies. The number of these organizations varies. To
evade detection, names and addresses are frequently changed-it
may be go today and only 75 next month!
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The business of recruitment took many forms. In the oase
of most of those who left the GDIR , the promise of higher wages,
promotion, comfortable apartments and other amenities not then
obtainable in the GDR was sufficient. But if these inducements
proved insufficient, the "head-hunters" used other methods. Elaborate systems for studying the past and present records as well as
the private lives of GDR citizens were put into operation. A
nazi past, a long-forgotten police record, marital infidelity, even
remarks critical of the GDR gO'vernment were used to' "persuade"
people to' leave for the West. ,C hildren and young girls were not
exempted. A yO'uth whO' could be persuaded to com'e over for a
"night of fun" could also be induced to remain and put pressure
on his family to leave.
The propaganda value of every success achieved in thi,s campaign is evident. And it can be said that not only the Bonn and
West Berlin propagandists but alsO' those in the NAT'O count1rie.s
including kmericans, made the most of it. Every person who left
was represented as an "escapee" from "Communism." The wholesale recruitment of workers, spies, diversionists and provocateurs
was called a "Hight to, f.reedom." It was made to seem that the
CDR was one huge concentration camp of enslaved Germans,
all of whO'm ,\vere said to be intent on seizing any chance to overthrow their tormentors and choose the "free world."
Unfortunately, this picture of the sri tuation has become a stereotype in our O'wn country. Tihis is the picture most Americans
take with them when visiting Germany. It i~ a great phy-the
picture is a total distortion of reality. But most An1ericans looking at Berlin and the trwo German states have already been
brain", ashed.
"So the wall V\ as put up to stop this traffic. With what results?"
We put the question to' Hermann Axen and listened to' him
detail the developments since August 13, 1961.
"In the main it has been stopped," he said. "We now have a
strong frontier and one we can cDntrol. The theft of our consumer
goods has ended, and ,ve have curbed the head-hunters.
"The wall has paid O'ff economically, too. Of course it CO'St
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us something to build it and it costs to ma,i ntain it. But it's been
an investment from which we have profited and are still profiting.
All our economic goals were unattainable except in the main items
so long as the frontier remained open. We had planned a 33 per
cent increa~e in industrial output by 1961, but except for certain
major industries we managed to reaoh only 27 per cent. Today
we are exceeding our goals and doing it without strain."
Other figures w'e saw showed East Berlin's monthly industrial
output shot up from 14 million marks worth of goods prior to
August 13 to 20 l11illion lnarks worth by December 1961.
Axen said the matter of fulfilling economic plans and reaching
the planned goals became acute at the time of the fifth congress
of the Socialist Unity Party. The congress set the objective of
overtaking and surpassing vVestern Germany in per capita output.
This would have demonstrated to. the people in both German
states, had it been "achieved, that socialism was the superior system.
It was then that Bonn and the West German business community
accelerated their recruitment campaign, as well as their propaganda effort. They left the GD:R leaders no alternative but that
of countering their offensive wit]h a measure to cDntrol its frontiers.
For the bastion and launching-pad of the Bonn offensive was
West Berlin. This 'w as the center of all its activities, the administrative, organi~ing, directing center for its many thDusands of paid
labor recruiters, spies and provocateurs.
"Again and again we appealed to the occupation authorities
to. stop those activities," Axen continued. "We sent notes. We
sent documents. We turned over names and addresses. We supplied eye-wiLn~ss accounts of illegal activities, even of criluinal
activities. We got nowhere. The Western Powers, for their own
reasons, always sided with Bonn. They even supported and
assisted these activities. Do you think the Federal Republic and"
the West Berlin leaders could do this without the protection and
assistance of the occupation forces? They couldn't carryon for
a week."
At this moment Axen's secretaTY brou~ht in files of recent
issues of N eues Deutschland and the editor in chief pointed out
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reports of recent "es,c apes" of GDR citizens to the West.
"As you can see, they're still at it," he said. "They feel frustrated so they've become more reckless. They spend money and
hire people to dig tunnels under the wall-anything to bring the
contacts they've already establli shed out of the country and to. activize new contacts."
\Ve asked if all the people "escaping" or trying to lea\-e could be
characterized as agents of the West.
"No, not everyone. The wall actually produced hardship for
some people. Their relatives are in the West and they are here.
They have dear friends in the West. We took this into account
at the beginning and we s till do.
"When we put up the wall we arranged fO'r visits of West
Berliners to East Berlin. We announced that West Berliners were
free to come over, but we insisted on <?ur right to select those who
came. We had no intention of letting a swarm of. saboteurs and
spies enter our country under the pretext of having relat·ives or
friends here.
"We set up booths on the territory of the Berlin transit system
to facilitate this traffic. The o.fficials in these bo.oths were authorized to accept applications for entry-permits and to process them
quickly and efficiently. But no sooner had we opened these booths
than the West Berlin authorities launched a two-pronged attack
against them. When hundreds of West Berliners lined up to
apply for permits, crowds of hoodlums were organized and sent
to the booths. They threatened and assaulted the West Berliners
and in some cases tried to. set fire to the booths.
"At the same time, the West Berlin police appeared with warrants from t:he West Berlin Senate demanding that the booths be
closed. I must tell you frankly that the warrants indicated that
they had originally been issued by the Western occupation powers.
"Soon the booths had to be closed. But that doesn't end the
matter. We are still willing to allow West Berliners to visit East
Berlin if they apply for a permit with sufficient reason."
We reminded Axen that he had said the necessity to. secure its
economy, had been only one of the reasons for the GDR govern-

ment's decision to build the w.all. We asked him what other
rea.sons lay behind the decision. His remarks in answer to this
question concluded our int.erview. They are, we believe of paramount concern for Americans. But before recounting them it is
worth while to relate additional information we obtained concerning the "escapes to freedom."
Two of the people we saw had quite a lot to say on the subject
of the current "escapes." One was Josef Streit, GDR State Prosecutor, a post w.ith functions similar to those of our U.S. Attorney
General. The other was Waldemar Schmidt, deputy Mayor of
Berlin, the GDR's capital. Besides being extremely informative,
talking with these men w·as a rewarding personal experience. Like
other leading personalities of the GDR government, and in contrast to their counterparts in the Federal Republic, they were
Hfe-Iong anti-fascists. None are Johnny-come-lateHes to the antifascist struggle, or ex-nazis anxious to cover up their past. Schmidt
is a former Berlin machinist who became a working class leader
in his youth. The Gestapo arrested him in 1935. He stayed in
Hitler's prisons until he "was freed by Soviet troops in 1945. A~
for Streit, his background wa~ dramatized for us by an event in
West Germ.a ny which occurred shortly before our interview.
Streit was born and reared in Czechoslovakia's Sudeten area.
He grew up in the same town and at the same time as another
German named Wolfgang Fraenkel. Coincidence would have it
that while Streit became GDR Procurator ·G eneral, Fraenkel became the Feder~l R. epublic's Procurator General. But at the time
we talked with Streit, his townsman had been removed from the
FRG post aluidst much crit,icism and controversy.
Behind
Fraenkel's dismissal was an enormous file of documents establishing the FR·G procurator's participation in some of the worst
crimes commli tted by the nazis. T 'h e documents had been delivered
to W es t German officials by Streit.
Streit's path was different. He, too, might have followed
in the footsteps of Fraenkel and become a judge passing out
sentences on people the nazi~ wanted to exterminate. But when
Strert's father, a glass-maker, died after the first world war, the boy

31

learned printing and entered the working people's movement of
Czechoslovakia. In 1938 Streit was imprisoned by the Nazis. He
passed through Dachau and Malthausen concentration camps
be£ore he was freed in 1945 by United States troops. When such
a man speaks, you can't help thinking of the price he paid to
defend his conception of the truth.
"Yes, we have good reason to know about these escapes," he
said. "We've just finished a trial in the supreme court."
He opened a drawer and selected a large folder of legal
papers which he thumbed through and selected one to read.
"The principal defendants were Gottfried Steglich and Carston
~·fchr," Strait 3Jid. "They are members of the Girrman Group
in West Berlin, an organization which specializes in organizing
border incidents and "escapes."
"The Girrman organizatjon rnaintains a secret students' group
at the Ford University in West Berlin. According to Steglich,
this university group has three hundred members and functions
along strictly conspiratorial lines.
"You should know tha-t Steglich flunked out of high school
in the GDR in 1953. He went to West Berlin and received a
scholarship at Ford's universi.ty. He was a good pupil in other
things if not in his studies, and before we oaught him he had
been ass,i stant chief of a refugee reception center at 20 Suedwestkorso, in West Berlin. Like all the members of the Girrman
group who do full-time work for tha1t group, he was also on the
payroll of the West Berlin Senate.
"We know, and witness Juergen Miehlke substantiated our
knowledge during the trial, that the Ginman organization has a
special so-called 'tunnel detachment' who got a plan of the city's
underground sewers, cables and passageways from no less authoritative a source than the office of West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt.
"D,e fendants testified at the trial that members of the Girrman
organization systematically visit the GDR at fixed intervals. They
come to ferret OUit terminal points for tunnels and to arr1a nge for
escapes. Every person recruited for an escape brings the Girrman
agent a four hundred mark bonus.

"We found five weapons on the defendants-Browning automatics used in the Belgian army. One also had an Americanmade walkie . .talkie to talk from the east side of the wall to his
fI1iends in '''Test Berlin. Both were convicted, and at the end
of the trial Steglich appealed to his colleagues in West Berlin
to stop working for the Girrman oT~anization."
"And what was the outcome of the trial?" we asked.
"Steglich got fifteen years. Mohr received seven."
"How do these people come over from West Berlin?"
"Through the control posts. You see, any West Berlin cItIzen
can come over if he has a permit. A student might say, for
example, that he wants to obtain material from our l(i braries.
Unless he has a record or our people can identify him as a member
of -s ome hostile organizaJtion, he is given a permit. For those
that don't care to subject themselves to OUT examination, there is
another way.
"Steglich testified that he had forged t1w o hundred and thirty
passports and "had used the passeports of ci tizens of Switzerland,
Denmark, Belgium and Sweden. Stegl,i ch testified that he personally had supplied melnbers of his organization with these passports and had issued each one a packet containing some of "the
currency, cigarettes, matches and clothes labels of the country
which issued the passport. They preferred Swiss and Austrian
passports because that would eliminate the problem of language."
Sometime later in our own "c ountry we had cause to recall
Streit's conversa.tion. We read a United Press Internat'i onal report
from Berlin dated September 19, 1962. It related the "escape to
freedom" of 29 persons through such a tunnel ,.vhose constructIon
-in the words of the press report-had been "undertaken with
the full knowledge of the West Berlin city government." The
report went on to declare that "Mayor Willy Brand't press office
said that work on the tunnel was carried out by university students,
reported to be graduate students of West Berlin's Technical
University."
In the office of the deputy mayor of East Berlin we gained
another li nsigh t in to the "escapes to freedom." I t was an aspect
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we Americans seldom if ever read or hear about-the flight to the
E'ast. The editor of N eues Deutschland had estimated that during
the period from 1949 to 1961 approximately half a million people
had come to the GDR from the West. Waldemar Schmidt brought
the figures up to date.
"Every day West Berliners and West Germans send us applications for citizenship in our country," he said. "They want to
remain and to lh,e and work here, and among them are many
former 'political refugees.' Of course, we screen these applications
very thoroughly. \Ve keep most of the applicants. Some we send
back."
,
"How many stay?"
"About .ten or twelve every day."
This is something most Americans know nothing about. The
"~sca'Pes" we've heard or read of have always been "to the free
world," that is, to West Berlin and West Germany. According
to the picture of life in the tWlO German states which most Americans have had stuffed into their minds, why would any sensible
German want to go to the GDR? We put the question to Mayor
Schmidt.
"rJ.1hey come for 'many reasons," was his answer. "For jobs
which they know they can ge,t here. For OUT pensions and social
security which they oan't get in West Germany. Then, some of
,these people lived here before and want to return to spend the
rest of thejr lives in their birthplace. Some have parents and
other relatives, some have old friends they want to be near. Most
cf the youth who come do so to escape the militarization of West
Germany. They don't want to serve in an anny like the army
their Eathers and uncles served in-and maybe died in."
"Do any come for political reasons?"
"Yes, some do. Some see what is happening in West Germany
and fear the 1930'S are coming back again."
Mayor Schmidt anticipated an increase in the flow ~f Germans
from the West. We gathered that he believed the West German
~oom had levelled off and the economic situation in the Federal
Republic would continue to deterior.ate. The demand for work-
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ers had ended and unemployment was beginning to rise. Big
struggles for increased wages and social security were under way
in the trade unions. We know today that Schmidt was right.
That doesn't mean, hmvever, that efforts to recruit citizens of
the GDR will be abandoned. The economic motivation may disappear, but this can spur even more intense efforts to penetrate the
wall. Economic difficulties, by increasing the discontent of the
resettled Gennans, may give added force to revanchist propaganda,
to demand for "restoring our lanrls and properties in the East."
Our interview with Mayor Schmidt helped clarify a number
of facts about the Berlin wall, whi<:h in turn led us to the conclusion that:
1. The wall represents not an act of aggression against the
West but an act of defense against attacks from the West.
2. The wall represses only, the small minority of citizens of the
GDR whose activities jeopardize the security and interests of the
majority of GDR citizens; it serves to protect the interests and
security of the majority of the GDR population.
3. By no stretch of the imagination does the wall in any way
whatsoever constitute an infringement on or a threat to the rights
and interests of the Amerioan people.
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lV.

THE "TAME" TIGER IN OUR FLArr
Having established these facts to our own satisfaction, we
decided to follow up another popular notion which we fel t required investigation. This is the widespread belief that there is
no individual liberty in the GDR, no comfort, no material wellbeing, no freedom from care, no gaiety. According tQ this view,
widely held by misinformed Americans, everything is drab and
dull in the GDR, life is a continuous struggle and drudgery, people
are shoddily dressed, often go hungry, and no one dares say ,,,,hat
he really thinks for fear of the secret police.
This belief feeds and supports the "escape to freedom" propaganda; it is little wonder, then, that the Bonn and West Berlin
propagandists have nurtured it so assiduously. Americans who
repeat it uncritically and spread it as gospel truth are not doing
their fellow-countrymen a service. This "truth" bears no relation
whatsoever to reality.
We attended a forum of wQrking and student youth in the
university town of Jena. Present were officials of the GDR governmen t, the ci ty administration, the Soci1alis t U ni ty Party, and
the Free German Youth. The hall was packed to the rafters,
wlhich is the only place where we found seats. We had been
informed that these forums are held at regular intervals all over
the GDR. Their aim is to enlist the interest and participation
of young Germans in efForts to solve the problems of local communities, ci·ties, and the 'G D·R as a whole. The youth are enGOuraged to raise any question that concerns them. No holds are
barred.
It was an extraordinary experience for us. We had just been

to Buchenwald and made notes of, among other things, the two
signs on the gates, hanging just as the nazis had placed them for
the edification of their v.ictims: "To each his just desserts," and
"My oountry, right or wrong." Buchenwald and what it represented had made of ,the Germans-those that survived-a nation
Df silent people. Now here, a few miles from Buchenwald were
gathered the children of those silent Germans. HDW would they
behave?
They behaved as you would expect a similar gathering of
American youth to behave~with one point of difference. They
spoke without restraint or self-consciousness. They vied for the
chance to speak. They heckled one another as well as the speakers ·
on the platfDrm. If they didn't like a speech or a statement, they
booed. If they liked it, they whistled and stamped their feet. The
one point in which they differed from most American student
audiences was this: they were amazingly well-infDrmed Dn international and national affairs.
Here are some of the questiDns they asked:
"Why did we have to postpone the realization Df our eCDnDmic
plan for overtaking West Germany f~om Ig61 to' Ig65?"
"Why did we make such a difficult plan in the first place?"
"Why did our newspapers puhlicize the g-oals so much?"
"W!h y did we cut out our airplane industry, and who was responsible for this mistake?"
There were, of CDurse, other questions to be expeoted from
an assemblage . of youth: "Why is Jena so dull for youth? Why
does our radio plague us on Saturdays and Sundays with broadcasts about collective farms?"
Filled with phony preconceptions of German youth, we were
astounded at their conduct and paliticipatiDn in the forum. We
had expected flo hear questiDns like the last one, but we had not
dnticipated that the German youth of today would be so deeply
concerned wi th every aspect of their country's economy, and would
boldly challenge their government leaders to explain and account
for mistakes.
Such a forum could not take place in the Federal Republic.
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Though some West German youth have managed to sustain a genuine interest in the economic and political development of the FRG,
they have not been encouraged to express their views, certainly
not if their views are critical of the Establishment. In the Federal
Republic, silence is Sltill golden.
.
As for the "drabness" of GDR life, one wonders how this idea
gained currency. True, night clubs as we know them, dance
halls and honky-tonks are in short supply in the GDR. Prostitution
has been eliminated. Some of the boys might gart her in a back
room for a quiet game from time to time, but gambling is also
in its death throes. There is plenty of drinking, but mostly in
homes. Add up all of these items and for some people the total
may amount to a dull life. But this was not our impression of
people's lives in the GDR.
The per capita participation in sports, for instance, far exceeds
our own. We visited the GDR University for physical culture and
sports in Leipzig and learned that a large propoI'ltion of its 2,000
students were adult workers studying through correspondence
courses. One of the most comfortable, most scenic train rides in
the world is the jou~ney down the Elbe from Berlin, and all this
country is virtually a sportsman's paradise. Individuals, families,
groups-here in the Elbe Valley during the summer they are swimming, boating, hiking, camping, playing all kinds of games, andbelieve it or not-apparently Liking it!
.
There is good music on the Berlin radio. Admittedly, we
shared the desire of many German youth for more of the popular
tunes. But no one can complain they don't hear the clasSlics.
Nor is there ground for compla'i nt about East Berlin's theater fare.
The nights we attended the Berlin Brecht Ensemble and the Berlin
Opera in March, 1961, the East Berliners were far outnumbered
by the West Berliners! We remember asking ourselves at that
time, cell life its so much gayer and pleasanter in West Berlin
than it is here, why in heck don't some of these West Berliners
go home and let us get to the coffee counter?"
It's even said in the West in all seriousness, that love has been
outlawed in the GDR and that one never sees young couples dis-

play affection for -one another. This kind of idiocy is} of course,
easily put to rest by a single statistic: in East Berlin there are 15
births per 1,000 people; in West Berlin only ten.
As for the material well-being of people in the GD'R , we found
no one badly off, no one without shelter, clothes, shoes, personal
necessit-ies, or enough to eat. Stories of mass hunger, of homeless
people, of children withoUit shoes or clothes are simply falsehoods.
What we saw of housing conditions in the GDR compares favorably with what we saw in any of the working class districts 'of
West Berlin, London and Paris. It certainly stands up well in
comparison with the working class districts of New York, Chicago
and Los Angeles.
There is a housing shovtage in the GDR, and ' in the cities
which suffered great bomb and artillery damage there is still
overcrowding. Mayor Schm'i dt told us that about 30,000 East
Berliners still needed fiats. He estimated that a few years more
would be required to saltisfy this need. In the last few years the
East Berlin administration has built approximately 10,000 flats
per year, but the construction of a chemical industry and electrical
equipment plants, as well as a civic center at Marx-Engels Platz,
have now been given priority.
During both our visits to Germany we sruw an abundance of
food in GDR stores. Meat, vegeta:bles, fowl and fruit were available everywhere. However, we were told by friends that shortages
of one or another food do occur. And we read in GDR publications of l,a st August that meaJt was in shor.t supply and that a
system of customer registration had to be established so as to
prevent inequity in distribution. There had also been a shof1tage
of potatoes which are a staple of the Gennan diet.
These shol1tages give rise to complaints and grumbling, as
might be expected. Customer regi~tration, as we have reason to
know from our wartime experiences, is disagreeable. But shortages in . some foods is not hunger, customer registrat~on is not
slt arvation, and grumbl;ing is not revollt. To say that they mean
the sa:me thing may be good cold war propaganda, bu t no one
should mistake it for the truth.
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What the shortages and customer registnlltion indicate is that
the GDR has not yet ensured the uninterrupted supply of all kinds
of food for its population. We inquired about this and talked
wIDth a number of people responsible for planning Ithe country's
economic growth. We were told that the harvest was lean last
winter because of the weather. The shortage of fodder forced the
slaughter of livestock, resulting in a shortage of mealt. An agricuI1turai specialist gave a more fundamental explanation. Re
thought the GDR had been unahle to make the massive investment required for a more rapid development of its chemi1cal industry and the mechanization of farm work. This, he believed, was
one of the consequences of the West German economic offensive
against the ,G D:R .
Wha/t ever the cause, the government appeared to be concerned
with solving the problem once and [or all. During .our visrit we
were given to underSltand that leaders of the government and
the political parties were engaged in meetings with farnlers and
agonomists. Nelles Deutchland and other GDR ne,vspapers were
carrying al'lticles about various aspects of the problem. Already a
change had begun. The first half of 1962 regiSitered a 12.5 per cent
increase in industrial and agricultural output over the same period
of the preceding year.. And G,D R citizens insist that despite
shortages and the lag in fertilizer manufaoture and mechanization
It hey consume more protein £ood per capita than the people of
West Germany. They claim they achieved this superiority several
years ago, 'W1hile the frontiers were open, and they have figures
to prove it: 57.1 kilograms of mealt consumed per oapita in the
GD,R in 1960 as against 54.5 kilograms in the Federal Republic;
13.6 kilograms of butter as against 7.8 kilograms in the FRG; 3 0 .3
kilograms of sugar as against 27.3 kilograms in West Germany.
These realities of life in the GDR cleared up many questions
that had been b.o thering us. They made it clear that West German
propaganda about conditJrons in the GDR is fabricated out of
thin air. In respect to all the necessities that make for material
well-being, Germans in the GD,R were not in any degree worse
off than the Germans living in the FoRG. To be sure, they wanted
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more alnenilties, more luxuries. They were critical of mistakes
and shortcomings of their leade.vs. But that didn't mean they were
timpatient to bring back their former employers and landlords
and restore them in government. They had emphasized this
die tinction on more than one occasion.
They had done it in June, 1953. The West Berliners and
the Bonn politicians may still talk about a "popular uprising."
They may name the street leading into West Berlin from the
Brandenburg Gate after that event-"June 17 Street"-and boast
that only the intervention of SOVliet troops had defeated the
"revolt." In the GD,R everyone kno.ws the people themselves
crushed that fascist putsch, that the Soviet troops intervened only
in Berlin, and that even there the workers had begun to arm for a
showdo.wn with the provocateurs from West Berlin.
They did it again when the wall was built. Workers who had
previo.usly been co.nsidered "non-political" by their colleagues
vol un teered to guard the facto.ries and cri tical poin ts of the frontier. Two hundred thousand youth had to be turned away from
People's .A.rmy enlistlnent stations because· of insufficient housing
to acco.mmodate them. Applications for membership in the Socialis t U ni,ty Party sharply increased.
When West German leaders ignore these facts, and other evidence of the GD,R population'S determinatJion to build socialism
in their country, is it merely because they are blind to the realities
or is ift also because they fear these realities? When they keep
insisting "'we must rescue our hrothers," is it no more than a case
of "none so blind as t'hey who. will not see?" True, in the past
the West German leaders have demDnstrated that they possess
more than their full measure of these afflictions. But it is significant that they use drastic and brutal measures to prevent the
West German population from learning these realities and acting
on them.
The concensus of opinion in the GDR is Ithat the West German
leaders are fully aware of the realities of life in the GDR, but
are bent Dn colliding with these realities-·w ith their eyes wide
open-even though they kno.w that to do. so means to encounter

resistance. They are like a driver who, seeing the traffic snarl
at an intersection, deliberately ignores the traffic signal and speeds
past the red light, though it means an inevitable collision. The
weight of evidence strongly suggests that a collision was the driver's
intent. And that is exactly how the people of the GDR regard
the provocations and the propaganda of the West German leadersan armed clash is their aim.
If one were to pursue the analogy of the driver a little fur,ther
and argue that if sober he was insane or bent on suicide, the
analogy would {;l1I flat at this point. No GDR. leader believes
Bonn Chancellor Adenauer and War MiniSlter Strauss or Alfred
Krupp and Herm1ann J. Abs of the Deutsche Bank are insane or
tired of living. No one believes they are unaware of the fact that
an armed clash 31t ~he Berlin wan will bring NATO troops
into collision with troops of the Warsaw Alliance. Or, more specifically, American forces illlto collision wi~h Soviet forces. Nor is
there doubt that in Bonn and Cologne and Essen and Hamburg
the leading circles understand full well what that kind of a collision-in these days of hydrogen-tipped nuclear missiles and the
present relationship of forces being what it is-will mean for them.
No, it would be misreading the signs to think that the WeSlt Berlin
politicians, militarists and induSitrialists are ins'a ne or bent on
suicide. Behind ~heir rashness is a calculated risk, of course, but
there is also' something else-another aim.
This was lhe hypothesis to which the logic of everything we saw
and heard in the two German states led us. We didn'lt reach it
quickly or easily. We reached it only after assimilating a vast
accumulation of statistics, interviews, impressions, newspaper clippings, magazine articles, books, official documents, and notes, notes
notes about everything we saw, heard and experienced. It was a
maze of information, some of which led off into blind alleys or
meaningless detours. OU,r chit-chat with Germans alone would
add up to a sizable volume. What illuminated the entire mass
of data, however, was the almost casual account Hermann Axen
gave us of why the wall had been built in the first place. It ,vas
close to Neues Deutschland's deadline and Axen had already ex42

plained the economic significance of the wall. Then, wi thou t
any change of tone, "Furthermore," he declared, "you Americans
should bless us for building the wall. None Df us would be here,
very probably, if we had nDt built it."
It w·ag said casually, and it wasn't very different from the kind
of remarks one hears frequently in these times. Had it come fro.m
almos1t anyone of our acquaintances we might have shrugged it
off. But we didn't, because Axen didn't impress us as a main
inclined to $-peak lightly about such a matter, or even to be casual
about it. On the contrary, he was very serious.
"'P ossibly YDU will rememher that in the spring and summer
of 1961 Prime Minister Khrushchev had much to. say about a
peaceful settlement of the German question. He made several
speeches in his own country on the questiDn, and in Vienna on
June 4 he presented your President Kennedy with a memor-andum
which contained the Soviet prDposals as to how a settlement could
be reached peacefully."
The substance of that memorandum was the well-known Soviet
proposal to conclude a German peace treaty. In order to negotiate this, Khrushchev also proposed immediate convocation of a
peace conference, establishment 'Of West Berlin as a free city, and
a suggestion that the talks on such a treaty be held ,to a period
of six months. The memorandum also stipula1ted a num:b er of
concessions which the Soviet Union was prepared to m'a ke so as
not to "prejudice the interests of the United States or other powers
in Europe," as the wording of the document puts it. The memo
assured President Kennedy that 'the Soviet Union would not demand the immediate wilth<kawal of the Federal Republic from
NIATO; would not seek the recognition of the German Democratic
Republic or cite Federal Republic of Germany by all parties to. the
treaty; would not object to two ·t reaties if the United States is not
reaci.y to sign a single peace treaty ,vith hoth German states; \vould
not object-in order to guarantee the free status of West Berlint o the s,tationing of "token contingents of troops" of the four
occupying powers, or of "troops Df neutral countries under Uni:t ed
Nations auspices for the same purpose."
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The memo also stipulated Soviet willingness to accept an
"interim solution" of the Berlin question "if for one reason or
another the Governments of the United States and other Western
powers are not ready f'Or this." It assured President Kennedy
that "the Soviet Government is ready to exa'm ine any constructive
proposals by the United StJates Government on a German peace
treaty and normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The
Soviet Government will show the maximum of good will in order
to solve the problem of a German peace t'r eaty by mutual agreement between the USSR, the United States and the other states
concerned." Finally; Khrushchev's memorandunl said that "if the
United States does not show an understanding of the necessity
for concluding a peace treaty, 'we \'V'ould regret this since we would
have to sign a peace treaty, which it would be impossible and
dangerous to delay further, not with all states but only with those
that wIa nt to sign it."
This memorandum, wlhich 1TIOSIt Americans seem not to have
read, struck several new notes. The proposal that the powers
negotiate a settlement of the German question was not one of
them, having been made in 1949, 1952, 1954 and 1959. One thing
that was new was the eXltent to which the Soviet Union was ready
to accommodate its interests so as not to prejudice American
interests. Another thing that was new ,vas the memorandum's
tone of urgency in face of the growing militarization and declared
revanchist aims of the West Germ,an state. The memo said: "The
question of a peace treaty is the question of the national security
of the USSR and many other staJtes."
Hermann Axen continued his account. "You know what happened. Your government repLied on July 17 and said there was
no need for a peaceful settlement because West Germany was
not threatening anyone. Keep the date in mindl l it'S important
because nine days before, on July 8 to be precise, Adenauer's
Christian Democrats had held a secret session at Bonn and issued
a communique. In this communique they dropped for the first
time their usual demagogy about the reunification of Germany.
They said the question of German reunification would be solved
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by integrating all of Germany into NATO."
He asked us if we thought our government knew about this
decision of Adenauer'sparty at the time of drafting the reply to
the Soviet Union. We replied that we didn't know since it was the
first time we had heard about the Bonn communique. Axe'll
continued.
"Another date. May 1961. The NATO Military Planning
Committee met in Washington and produced a plan to finish
rearming West Germany this year. If you look over the planthey call it MC g6-·-YOll'll see it has in mind ' Vest G ermany's
nuclear armament."
Adolph Heusinger, one of Hild er's top generals, a war criminal
wanted for atrocities against Soviet people and for exterminating
Jews, is chairman of NAT'O 's Military Planning Committee and
has an office in the Pentagon in Washington. Certainly the State.
Depalitment knew of this NATO plan before drafting the reply
to Moscow's memo.
IThere was another date about which Axen could not be certain.
It was during the visit of Adenauer and Strauss to Washington
in the SpTing of 1961. He didn't ·know the precise date of their
ta]l~ with President Kennedy. It ·was April 12 or 13.
"They asked Kennedy for help in supporting an uprising in
the GDR. Kennedy was ·s kept1ical of their conviction it could be
pulled off successfully. He told them to go ahead if they thought
they could do it, but not to bank on U ni:ted States support. ,tVe
unders.tand that he felt if it worked, fine; if it didn't wQrk h would
discredit us and our claim to have a peace treaty. So, fQur dattes,
and they all add up to something."
The implication was clear. Even if the President had not been
apprised of the ChTistian Democvatic Party's communique of
July 8, even had he discounted elements of danger in the NAT·O
plan of May, he could hardly have been impervious to the intentions of the West German leaders. His conversation with theIn ,
ifAxen's information was ·c orrect, had occurred even before his
meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. This was the logic Q1f i,t,
but logic alone doesn't always provide the correct conclusion. We
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wondered aloud if that had spurred the GDR to put up the wall.
Axen shook his head.
"T·h at was only part of it. Knowing Bonn's intentions, knowing the Bundswehr's capabilities, knowing Kennedy's attitude to
an attack on us, to another attempted putsch-this was only part
of it. The other part is that preparations for war actually took
an active turn. NA.TO openly threatened war. There was a full
alarm throughout NATO. In Ig60, there were only two NAJTO
maneuvers; in Ig61, NATO held five. This was done when
Heusinger called for taotical atomic weapons to be st·a tioned
near our frontJieT.
"At the same time we observed signs of activization of certain
circles inside the GDR. "\Ve suddenly had a renewal of trouble
with the Church. O!l d nazis and dissidents beoame very act,ive.
It was only when all these things began Ito coincide that we notified
the Warsaw Powers we considered it necessary to fortify our froncler. Of course, they agreed."
Again the logic held. Certainly no government with a sense
of responsihility to its people could remain indifferent in the
face of such circumstances. One coincidence could be ignored,
two overlooked, three discounted after an eVlaluation, but when
the coincidences became still more numerous there was real cause
for concern. Yet, it seemed to us not unlikely that when Adenauer
and Strauss learned they could not count on the United States
to pull their chestnuts out of the fire they discarded the scheme.
In that case the GDR may have built the wall unnecessarily, at
least from the standpoint of its mHitary defensive funotion. Axen
didn't think so.
"It must surely have interested Americans to observe what
ha ppened after the wall was built. The Wes t Germans and the
West Berliners ranted and raved but they didn':t attack the wall.
In fact, not a single revanchist dared show up at ,t he wall. But
Willy Brandt called on Kennedy to attack the wall. He wrote a
letter asking Kennedy to 'take the final risk.' And when Kennedy
refused and sent your Vice PresideIllt Lyndon B. Johnson to make
big speeches against the wall without doing anything about it,
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Bonn and West Berlin were fuvious. They began to a,t tack Kennedy for 'selling them down the river.' For a time Kennedy and
his 'eggheads' were held responsible. It was a case of history
repeaJting itself. After the first big war they held the pacifists
and socialists responsible for defeat. After the second war they
even got around ro blaming Hitler. Now it's your turn."
By the time we left Berlin, ,ve felt we had seen and heard
enough to warrant still another conclusion about the wall. After
weighing the evidence we are prepared to stand by it: Not only
the 17 million Germans in the GDR were rescued from disaster
by the wall. The 50 million Germans in the FRG, the overwhelming majority of whom are ordinary people like ourselves,
busy at trying to make a living and raise families and find some
happiness and meaning in their lives, were also rescued from an
uncertain fate.
But what came home to us most directly was the conviction
that the wall was a godsend for the A me.rican people.
The decision to build the wall was a joint decision of th·e
Warsaw Pact powers. Prior to that decision there was concernwe would even say, deep anxiety-in all the socialist countries. We
know the feeling that swept the Soviet Union during the weeks
that preceded that decision. We read of manifestations of that
feeling in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
China-yes, even in the Mongolian People's Republic. l.lhere was
general alar,m that N'A TO's preparations, President Kennedy's callup of reserves and request for more funds for the military, and
the increasingly belligerent and arrogant tone of the vVest. German leaders indicated preparations for ,var. The Soviet Govei'nmellit expressed its own alarm by cancelling the scheduled demobHization of the 1,200,000 troops it had unilaterally decided to
return to civilian st'a tus at the beginning of 1960. It also resumed
nuclear weapons tests. Like the GDR government, none of the
Warsaw Pact governments accepted Plfesiden:t Kennedy'S assurances
that the West Germans were not able to wage war, were under the
"'c ontrol" of NAT'O which ,vas represented as being solely defensive, and had given their word not to use force.
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At that time it was common knowledge throughout the socialist
countries (and it certainly should have been told the American
people) that the Weslt German army numbered 300,000 actives
and 25 0 ,000 reservists; that the land forces had 2,400 tanks and
1,5 00 armored carriers; that the air forces included five fighterbomber squadrons adapted for carrying atom bombs, a missile
group and four N ike ground-to-air battalions; that the naval forces
included 17 combat squadrons including DWO of destroyers, four
of torpedo boats, seven of mine s,w eepers, one of landing crafta total of 240 vessels of whi<;:h 136 were combat ships. The equipment of these forces with missiles and other weapons of mass
annihilation had been going on since 1958. Ilts eight artillery
battalions attached to the divisions were armed with 203.3 mm.
atomic cannon. l It had three Honest John missile batalions attached
to the army corps. Since the spring of 1961, of course, all these
figures have been greatly augmented. BUtt already at that time
West Germany's armed forces had come to dominate NATO, and
as every American knows by this time, the top members of the
German General Staff, all former Hitler officers, held the leading
strategic roles in NAT IO.
The notion that West German membership in NATO would
somewhow exercise restraint on the Bonn politicians, Ruhr industrialists and old-line General Staff commanders, all of whom "were
either nazis and nazi supporters, is considered ridiculous-utter
unadul,terated nonsense-lin tJhe socialist countries and even amongst
the majority of West Europeans, who know these West Ger1m an
leaders from personal experience. We have heard the idea compared to the case of the animal trainer who tried to persuade his
neighbors in a crowded apartment house to let him keep a fullgrown Bengal tiger in his fiat. As the story goes, he gave his word
that the beast was tame, had been raised on milk, liked to be
cuddled, and, in any case, wouldn't leave 'his maste.r's fiat. Of
course the neighbors, people with rudimentary common sense, were
not persuaded. And the story ends with the line: "They are still
alive, but the poor tiger died."
N or ~re the people of Europe, West as well as East, disposed
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to stake their lives on the word of honor of these eX-iJlazis. They
remember too well how many times a West German leader's word
was broken at the very moment he was giving it. T 'hey don't
have to go to the history books for this infor'm ation-it's part of
their personal experience. Some Americans also know this. For
ins1tance, Fred Warner Neal, a former newspaper man and State
Department officer who is now a professor at the Claremont Graduate School, gave a lecture on July 20, 1961 in which he said:
, I V\ ell recall being in Frankfurt and Bonn in 19.50, on a
mission for the U.S. State Department, V\Then there were newspaper reports thaJt the W es t German governmen t had a 'defense
adviser.' This was indignantly denied by both the Americans
and the Germans, although everybody knew it w'as true. Then
it was admiltted, but the West Germ'a ns said, solemnly, they had
no defense ministry. A few months later the defense adviser
became minister of defense, but, the West Germans said, no
army. A few months, later there began to be organized a
German army, but, said the West Germans, no tradilt ional uniforms and no generals. A few lllonths later the army donned
t!he tradit.ional uniforms and the rank of general was re-established, but, it was said, no general staff, and so on. About the
same time West Germany adopted as its national anthem the
infamous 'Deutschland uber Alles/ but, it was said, the first
verse containing the offensive 'w'ords, would not be used. Now
the anthem begins, as before, 'Deutschland, Deutschland, ilber
Alles.'
"Goethe, in an untypical poetic burst of patriotism, once
wrote that ,vhen he thought of Germany he could not sleep.
I t is not surprising that today a great many other people cannot
sleep when they think of Gei'many-but for other reasons."'*'
Such keen observations of one of the most conspicuous European
,. War and Peace and the Problem of Berlin, by Fred Warner Neal, Marzani
& l\1unsell, Inc., New York, N. Y.
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realities come from few Amemcans, but one hears them in ordinary
conversations everywhere in Europe. The socialist governments,
keenly sensitive to every straw-in-the-'wind relating to changes in the
plans of Bonn, were alerted early enough during the spring of
1961 to take counter action. rrhese actions were understood quite
thoroughly by the public of the socialist states, and those journalists
erred who reported, for instance, that the Sov:iet people were not
informed of the resumption of nuclear tests by their government.
How cl1ey could mdss being informed, when every newspaper in
the Soviet Union devoted it~ entire front page to announcing the
governmen t' s decision, was never explained. The fact is that
the preparations of the Warsaw Pact countries to counter NATO
preparat.iQns were common knowledge throughout EurDpe, having
been publicized by the press of the s.ocialist countries.
Bonn also drew conclusions from the direction developments
were takting. When Adenauer and Strauss a~certained that the
Kennedy AdministraJtion was unwilling to commit the United
States to armed support 'Of an invasiDn 'Of the GDR, the West German calculated risk tODk 'On a new dimens,ion. I t was still possible,
however, to manufacture an incident and organize sufficient expressions of discDntent instide the GDR to serve as a pretext for moving
in "to rescue" t!he GD R popula1tion. If they could not count 'On
full American military support, they could be confident that the
Western occupation troops in West Berlin would not hinder anything they m,i ght do, and in addition, would be helpful in keeping
open the corridors from West Germany to West Berlin-thDse
"access rights" which all along have been indispensable for the
transportatiDn of spies, proV'OCaJteurs, criminals, and arms. West
Berlin, in point 'Of fact, is the keystone 'Of West German designs
'On the GDR and points eastward, and the continued presence 'Of
N.A TO occupation troops in West Berlin, requiring the indefinilt e
cDntinuation of "rights of access" to West Berl,i n, is the granite
core of that keystQne. 'Inerefore, even if Bonn's risk had been
increased by the Kennedy position, it had not expanded tQ insurmountable odds, and Adenauer and Strauss reckoned that if
the GD·R probe failed, the presence 'Of huge American, British and
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French occupation troops in West Germany would help to deter
a counter-blow. Until August 13, therefore, a West German strike
at the GDR had not been ruled out.
I t was ruled out by the wa.ll. The wall represented in no
uncert'a in terms that a West German strike at the GDR could not
succeed. But the wall also marked the culmination of a buildup
of strength by the Warsaw Pact powers. It dramatized not only
the GDR's intention and ability to repel an attack, but the intention and abiHty of the GD'R 's allies to deliver a counter-blow
whenever and wherever deemed necessary. The wall signified
to the West German leaders that the ris'k was too high, for what
they would be risking was their own physical existence. They did
not 'wish to take "the final risk." Just as later, during the Cuban
crisis, they were overjoyed at the prospect of an American-Soviet
collision and rusked to goad President Kennedy on with a pledge
of "support," so they would not have minded if Kennedy had tried
to smash the wall. And Willy Brandt let the cat out of the bag
in his letter to President Kennedy, a "mistake" for which he was
severely rebuked by the tactful and careful Herr Strauss.
One of the m'arvels of this entire sequence of events, which
developed over a period of several months, is that most of us
Americans knew nothing about ilt. Being journalists and fully
aware of the obstacles to getting the real story about most important developments, we do not relish the term "conspiracy of
silence" which is frequently tossed at our information media. Yet,
in this sort of development, which could have placed the national
security of the American people in jeopardy, Americans who knew
what was going on apparently did not consider it necessary to inform the public. We got our first hint of what was at st:ake in the
wall from the Bri tish, who paraded along Whitehall and around
Trafalgar Square bearing signs that said: "Better wall than warl"
Although the stage had been set to involve the United States as the
main combatant against the Warsaw Pact countries, the Britishfar more clearly than we-understood the consequences of such
an involvement. Why?

v.

A "CONSPIRACY" OF SILENCE"
When you mull these things ' over and do some home-<work in
recent history, our present position in relation to Ger·m any is likely
to conjure up two ghosts from the past: Pearl Harbor and Munich.
Let's face it! There Wlas no "conspiracy of silence" about the
events that culminated in the wall; Americans who knew what was
happening most probably did not see it as a danger to the A'm erican people. The Pearl Harbor inquiry established that OUY commanders in H 'a waii and the Philippines also saw what was happening, in fact, were informed of the posi tion and movemen ts of
the Japanese fleet; but they simply did not see those movements
as a threat to Pearl Harbor. We have already expressed our opinion that the case of the West Ger.m an leaders who ignore the
determination of the 17 million East Germans to build socialism
is N,O T a case of "none so blind as they who will not see," but
a case of an inten tion to su bvert and destroy the reali ty they
do see. The w.ise old saying was fully applicable at Pearl Harbor.
We believe it is relevant also in respect to the wall.
True, the owners of our media of information betray a selfhypnosis concerning everything that happens in the area of EastWest relations. Despite the factual record they attribute all incidents without exception to "the Communists," even to "the Kremlin." The Berlin "cl1ises" are invariably caused by "Communist
machinations" or "Soviet intransigeance." So long and so assiduously have they labored to construct this bogeyman that it is not
illogical to think that they have come to look upon their- contrivance as reality. And although our policy-makers in Washington should and perhaps do see what is before their eyes, their
long pre-occupation with the "Communist menace" and the "So-

52

viet threat" has become a film tha't obscures and distorts their
vIsion.
In Potsdam, about an hour's drive from Berlin, the American
tourist receives special attention. Particularly in the former manor
house of the H0'henzollern prince, a charming place beside a small
lake, are Ame~icans accorded a warm welcome. This was the
scene of the Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945.
iThe guides are delighted to lead Amerioans through this place,
to point out the piano used by President Truman, the study of
Churchill and, after his election defeat, of Attlee, the chair in
which Stalin sat. And pointing to one of the small balconies that
looked down on the conference table, she told us: "And there is
where your President Kennedy sat. He was a newspaper correspondent then." It was a reminder that President Kennedy is
fully aware 0'f the agreement at Potsda,m t0' implement the agreements at Yalta and Teher:an. These had, as their main content,
the commitment of the Anglo-Soviet-American allies to collaborate
in the destruction of German militarism both during the war and
after. Expliciltly staJted also in these agreements was the commitment to uproot and destroy nazism. Yet, t!he Kennedy AdmiIllistration to date is implementing quite a different policy, the policy
of rebuilding German militarism under leadership of ex-nazis as
an instrument against socialism and our wartime ally.
It is one of the great turn-abouts in history. For Americans
wi th even a rudimentary know ledge of recent history m us t surely
recall what happened during the war. A few years ago Adolf
Heusinger was planning the death of every American within firing
range. Now he silts in the Pentagon surrounded by boot-liclcing
American generals. A few years ago our war crimes tribunals
charged Hermann J. Abs, head of the Deutsche Bank, with having
directed muoh of the looting of nazi-occupied Europe, in the role
of a glorified German Al Capone. Today our biggest bankers, publishers and politicos-including Governor Nelson Rockefeller and
Henry Luce-parade Abs around the country as a paragon of virtue
and an oracle of truth. It is indeed unbelievable!

Nevertheless, ilt is no secret that such things could and did
happen. Most of us know that· a re-armed, ultra-reactionary
Germany was deliberately re-established-mainly by our government-as a "shield" against the socialist countries. The Germans
were to "hold the line" while we, with our atom-bomb monopoly,
were to be the "sword." We were told we had to have this "shield"
because "the Communists" were threatening our very survival by
trying to over~un all of Europe. We know today that this was
all a gigantic fraud, but at that time we didn't stop to consider that
the Soviets did not have the atom bomb, had just .fought four
years of a war in which they had lost 30 million people and half
of their induSltrial potential, and wanted nothing on earth S'O much
as a chance to bury their dead, heal their wounded, and rebuild
their devastated country. We fell for the cold war line then, and
allowed the Dulles brothers, Dean Acheson, John J. McCloy, General Lucius Clay and other dollar patriots to take over.
They took over completely. They scrapped Potsdam, Yalta and
Teheran. They let the nazis out of prison and handed over $10
billion of A'mer-iean taxpayers' money to ex-nazi bankers like
Abs, and to war criminals Hke Flick, Thyssen and the I'G Farben
gang. They set up the Adenauer government in the Federal Republic and split Germany into two staJtes. They drew the West
German state into NATO and sped the re-arming of the German
militarists, the restoration of German imperialism, and the return
of the nazis to political power.
Dulles, Acheson and company probably figured their gambit
had won the game before it really began. The W'est Germans
would grow strong enough to re-unite their country. They '\vould
then-who knoV\Ts? But for Dulles, Acheson and their friends, the
they were unable to do the job alone, if the "shield" faltered or was
repelled, the American "sword" would join the fray. It would
be the Germans who would take the brunt of the counter-blow,
the Americans who would deliver the coup de grace. ' There were
undoubtedly other calculations behind U.S. policy. People who
sounded like patriotism incarnate in declaiming th.a t "'we can'lt
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do business with the Communists" showed no compunction whatsoever in doing business with men who Hmassed fortunes from
the properties of six million murdered Jews. The most respectable
American corporate heads locked arms with the most degenerate
nazi thugs in a partnership to plunder first Germany, then Europe,
then-who knows? But for Dulles, Acheson and their friends, the
main aim was to use German blood and American machines for
the final showdown with the Communists. As John Foster Dulles
wrote in his book, War or Peace~ -t he calculation of these American
schemers was that by forcibly reuniting Ger.many and drawing the
GDR into NAT'O , West Germany would gain an advanced strategic position in Cen tral Europe which would undermine the Soviet
position and the socialist military and political position in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other adjacent countries.
This was not an original idea. Harry Truman w-a nted to play
the Germans off against the Soviets in 1941 after Hitler atit acked
the Soviet Union. By helping tthe side which was losing, Truman
said, America could let them kill each other off and then pick the
bones of both corpses. That very idea was also the kernel of the
"strategy" pursued by Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier as they led Britain and France down the road to Munich.
The tragic irony of ilts adoption by the American policy..makers
lay in the fact that they behaved as if they enjoyed the monopoly
of it. They acted as if the idea would never occur to the West
Germans.
The Germans behaved as might have been expected. They
pledged allegiance to NATO. They virtually kissed the backsides
of their filthy-rich, powerful uncle who so generously gave them a
few bills from his fat wallet and in addition handed them a gun.
And they solemnly vowed again and again and again that they
would never, never break the peace-except against the Communists. This exception so delighted their paJtron that he gave them
a free hand in their own country and in N'A TO; that is, in Western Europe. Read the speeches of every West German spokesman
who has come to the United States or spoken in Germany for

international consumption and you will find these themes inv.ariably and repeatedly emphasized. Then examine the structure of the West German government and you will find all the
major policy-m:a king offices in the Federal RepubHc occupied by
ex-na~is and Hitler generals. Look at West Europe; you will see
the Bundswehr where Hittler was unable to place them.
Something else happened, too. The wheel has come full circle.
The tail has come to wag the dog. The WeSit German leaders
are no longer the "shield." They have become a "sword," and
with nuclear ar,ms, they will be TH,E "s'word" of NATO and the
Atlan tic Alliance. This was the lesson of the Berlin wall, when
Adenauer and Brandt sought to. use Ameri'c ans as their "shield."
It is still the lesson Df West Berlin, where A1merican boys stand
guard over the interests of the ex-nazis.
If this lesson needs further study, one can reflect on the curti ous
falc t that the policy of our government seems to be identical to the
policy of the Wes t Gel1mla n leaders, indeed, is dictated by them.
It may not be apparent to us, but sober-minded, responsible
people in Briltain, France, I!taly, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Norway, Denmark and other EurDpean countries
simply do nOlt believe the Ruhr magnates and other powerful
West German industrialtists will relinquish their claims to exploit
the workers and to possess the plants, faotories, and lands ei ther
in Berlin, both East and West, or in the German Democratic Republic, or in the countries east of the Oder-Neisse line. They do
not bel,i eve that the Bonn poHticians will ever agree to recognize
the frontier between East and West Berlin, or the sovereignty
and authority of the GDR, or the permanence Df the Oder-Neisse
frontier. They do nOlt believe that vhe German general staff w,i ll
discard their drea,ms of revenge, conquest and glory through another war, and their schemes for obtaining the nuclear arms with
which to wage it. They do not believe that a war kindled by this
combination of Germ'a n monopolists, miliJtarists and politicians,
no mla tter whether a civil conflict or a small, local clash, can be
prevented from escalating into. a world war. They do not believe
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that if we Americans remain en tangled wi th these German monopolists, poJi.ticians and mil~tari'S ts, through N A TO and other
ties formed by our bUSIiness leaders and politicians, that we can
avoid being drawn into the conflict.
Listen to General Luoius D. Clay setting forth the "basic commitments which 1ve have made in Germany." The General, who
funations also as a direotor of a number of corpollations, such
as Continental Can, made ~hese remarks laSit June 18 at a New York
dinner:
"We have pledged ourselves in solemn language to protect
West Berlin. We have defined this protection to include freedom
of access by air for all and on the ground for the aBies; and to
maintain the viability of West Berlin which includes freedom of
access for persons and goods. We have promised to main~ain our
troops in West B'e rlin as long as its people want them. We have
also stated that we are opposed to any lessening of the ties which
now exist between Berlin and the Federal Republic. We are committed to the Federal Republic not to recognize the East German
Government, but to continue to support the l1ight of the German
people It o deter,m ine themselves in free elections the kind of government under which they want to li've. We have also stated that
the final boundary lines of the new Gelimany oan not be determined until there is a single German governm·e nt. These are the
bas,ic principles from which we can not devia!te ... and ,vhich vve
are prepared to defend with all the strengtJh at our disposal."
Is this an American speaking? It is hard to believe. What
springs to mind is not that Clay hi'm self has written in his book
Decision in Germany that "nothing w'as agreed upon" by the four
victor powers "that guaranteed a right of access nor were particul,ar righ ts gran ted on the roads, on the railroads or in the air" to
Berlin from West Germany. What strikes the eye is Clay's complete identification of the interests of the American people with
those of the West German monopolists, milital1ists and politicians.
They want the factories and plants of WeSlt Berlin protected in
the expectation of again o,vning and controlling them. Clay
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says "we" have pledged to protect them. They want access routes
to West Berlin kept open for the tran~port of agents, spies, criminals, money, goods and, when the time comes, troops for the
"unification" of Germany. Clay says "we" have pledged to keep
them open.
vhey want Amer-ioan occupation troops to stay as the "shield"
they need toO draw America and the Soviet Union into mutual annihilation, after which their "sword" will be supreme. Clay says
"we" will maintain our troops there.
They want no recognition of the German Democratic Republic.
Clay says H'we" will not recognize it.
They want no recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontiers. Clay
says "we" will not recognize them.
And, says Clay, "we" intend to stand by these com-m itments
with all the strength at our disposal, that is, ait the risk of national suicide.
From this it can be seen that General Clay could not more
f~i~hfully represent the interests of the West German monopolists
and miHtarists were he one of them. He has passed off as "our"
policy, that is, the policy of the A'm erican people, a policy in no
iota different from the pollicy of Adenauer and Strauss, Krupp and
A,bs, Speidel and Heusinger. In all of his remarks, the one basic
fact he neglected to mention was what vital American interest
is being protected by our West Berlin garrison of 6,000 ,m en, our
West German occupation force of about 200,000 troops! The
reason for Clay'S omission is simple: there ·is no vital American
national interest either in a West Berlin that remains -t he tinderbox of a new conflagr ation, nor in a West German state intent
on putting sparks to the "inflammables in that tinder..box. The
paramount, over-riding Ameri()an national interest, to which all
other national interests are subordinate, lies in peace-a peaceful
solution of the proble-m of '''Test Berlin and ,the problem of
Germany.
For the protection of American national interests, we require
an American policy, not a 'G erman policy, and especially noOt a
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policy corresponding to the aims and needs of !the ,mos t reactionary
oircles in Ge,r many. How 'c an American national interests be protected by a nazi policy?
We repeat, the true vital American national interest, that is, the
true interest of the overwhel,m ing majority 'Of the people who
make up the American nation, requires stability and peace in
Europe. Wi,th West German militarization almost completed, it
is already very late to act for European stability. The wily men
of Bonn, flattering the megalomanic De Gaulle, have already begun the creation of an alliance with which Ito dominate Western
Europe and determine the course 'Of NATO. Neither the Ruhr
kings nor the French money-bags have undying affection for the
United States. To provoke a general conflagration in the hope of
comli ng out alive on top of lthe heaIp of corpses requires no more
military pow'er than they presently command. All it takes is an
incident that will embroil AmeJ'ica with the Soviet Union-an incident that can be manufaotured any day of the 'week in West
Berlin.
'Dhe true vital American national interests requires a new approach to ,the Soviet Union and the socialist world. I t requires
not merely coexistence with the Soviet Union, not merely an armed
truce, but cooperation in achieving Sltability in central Europe.
For 17 years now the policy of 'b uilding up Germany as an antiSoviet and anti-,Communist military force has benefitted no one
but the mortal enemies of the Amer~can people and the handful
of Americans who make money on it. And it has brought us far
down the road to another Munich-to another Munich in the
nuclear age!
The Soviets have again invited us, have implored us in fact,
to participate with them and other intereSited states in elimina;ting
the conditions through which the W es t Germans hope to set off
an American-Soviet clash. That means solving the problem of
West Berlin, the problem of ~he GDR-FRG frontier, the question
of the Oder-Neisse border. The reasonableness of the Soviets in
respect to the Cuban crisis and K.hrushchev's renewed appeal for
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negotiation on the other outstanding questions suggests that a
new effort to r esolve the problem of Berlin can succeed.
Regardless of whether Adenauer and De Gaulle or anyone else
opposes it-and Bonn and Paris are certain to oppose it-we believe our government should accept this invitation. We believe
our acceptance would conform to the true national intereSits of the
great majority of the American people.
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